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POLITIK FEDERALISME, KE-ETNIKAN DAN PEMBANGUNAN NEGERI 01 
MALAYSIA: SATU KAJIAN KES KERAJAAN BERJAYA 01 NEGERI 
SABAH, 1976-1985 
ABSTRAK 
Tesis ini adalah satu kajian ilmiah tentang perkembangan politik semasa 
Berjaya memegang tampuk pemerintahan di negeri Sabah, dari tahun 1976 -1985. 
Tesis ini bertujuan untuk memberi tumpuan kepada tema-tema yang dominan dalam 
bidang kajian sains sosial mengenai Sabah. Tema-tema ini khususnya berhubung-
kait dengan isu-isu federalisme, ke-etnikan dan juga politik Pembangunan 
(developmentalisme). Secara amnya, tesis ini mencadangkan bahawa: Kemunculan 
suatu wacana politik Pembangunan dalam pemerintahan Berjaya berasal-usul dari 
kegagalan Berjaya untuk menyelaraskan isu-isu politik tempatan berikutan dengan 
tuntutan-tuntutan daripada pemerintahan Pusat yang berkedudukan lebih kuat. 
Kegagalan inilah yang menyebabkan Berjaya untuk mencari suatu strategi alternatif 
yang bertujuan untuk mengukuhkan sokongan dan juga kedudukan politiknya sendiri. 
Penubuhan parti Berjaya adalah hasil daripada sokongan Kerajaan Pusat dan 
perkembangan tersebut telah membolehkan satu proses pengelolaan dan juga 
perluasan kuasa Kerajaan Pusat dalam politik tempatan di Sabah. Namun begitu, 
Berjaya juga tidak terlepas dari kemelut politik yang sering menjadi isu pemerintahan 
Kerajaan Pusat, dan yang juga sering membatasi proses tersebut. Dalam konteks ini, 
pucuk Pimpinan Berjaya pun merujuk kepada politik Pembangunan atau 
developmentalisme sebagai satu wacana yang wajar untuk mengekalkan kedudukan 
politik Kerajaan Berjaya. Dasar-dasar Pembangunan kerajaan Berjaya sebahagian 
besarnya lebih berasakan politik dalaman parti Berjaya, dan kebanyakan strategi-
strategi Pembangunan lebih memenuhi kepentingan para pihak yang memberi 
sokongan kepada kerajaan Berjaya. Mereka ini terdiri daripada individu terpilih 
melalui jaringan penaung (patronage network), sistem ABC dan secaranya amnya 
dasar-dasar ini juga memberi lebih keutamaan bagi Pembangunan Islam di negeri 
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Sabah. Strategi developmentalisme ini memang berkesan dalam penggal pertama 
Kerajaan Berjaya berkuasa (1976-1985) kerana pembangunan ekonomi yang agak 
pesat di negeri Sabah pada masa itu. Namun begitu sejak kelembapan ekonomi 
negeri Sabah bermula pada tahun 1982, iaitu awal permulaan penggal kedua 
pemerintahan Berjaya, strategi tersebut telah menimbulkan isu-isu etnik dan justeru 
itu melemahkan sokongan politik bagi kerajaan Berjaya, terutamanya daripada 
golongan bumiputera bukan-Muslim. Walaupun kerajaan Berjaya mendapat 
sokongan Kerajaan Pusat yang kukuh dibawah pimpinan Mahathir, namun Kerajaan 
Berjaya gagal mendapat mandat untuk memerintah seterusnya. Kesimpulannya, 
percubaan untuk menghasilkan satu kerajaan negeri yang bersedia mematuhi segala 
tuntutan-tuntutan kerajaan Pusat melalui kerajaan Berjaya telah gagal kerana usaha 
tersebut tidak memberi perhatian terhadap dimensi isu-isu politik setempat di negeri 
Sabah. 
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THE POLITICS OF FEDERALISM, ETHNICITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN A 
MALAYSIAN STATE: A CASE STUDY OF THE BERJAYA GOVERNMENT 
IN SABAH, 1976-1985 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the political development of the Malaysian state of 
Sabah under the administration of Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (BERJA Y A -
Sabah People's United Party), which controlled the state legislature between 1976 
and 1985. It attempts to disentangle the three dominant themes within social 
scientific studies of Sabah: the issues of federalism, the politics of ethnicity, and the 
political economy of development. The broad argument that the thesis makes can be 
summarized thus: The emergence of a developmentalist discourse under the 
BERJA YA regime in Sabah can largely be traced to its failure to reconcile the 
localized ethnic politics of Sabah with the demands of a strong central state and thus 
the need to find an alternative strategy of political support and control. The formation 
of BERJAYA at the behest of the federal government, it is argued, began a process 
of rationalization and the extension of federal control over Sabah politics. Yet 
BERJA YA also became embroiled in the ongoing factional disputes on the federal 
level, limiting the impact of this process. In such a context, the BERJAYA leadership 
turned to developmentalism as its main legitimizing discourse. BERJA YA's policies of 
development were considerably party-oriented and most of the strategies of 
economic development benefited primarily at those who supported the BERJAYA 
government both in terms of select individuals who benefited from patronage 
networks and in a broader perception of preferential treatment for Muslims. While this 
strategy proved effective while developmental growth was high during the first 
BERJAYA administration (1976-1981), the relative collapse of the state economy 
from 1982 onwards exposed its ethnic predilections and prefigured declining support 
for the regime, particularly among the non-Muslim bumiputera groups. Despite the 
consolidation of federal support for BERJAYA under the Mahathir administration, the 
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unravelling of the BERJAYA project was by this stage unstoppable. In the final 
analysis, the attempt to create a more compliant state administration under 
BERJA Y A came undone precisely because it failed to take into acGount the localized 
dimension of politics in Sabah. 
XIV 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: FEDERALISM, ETHNICITY 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis addresses both empirical and theoretical questions. Empirically, it is 
a study of the political development of the Malaysian State of Sabah under the 
administration of Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah {BERJAYA- Sabah People's United 
Party), which controlled the State legislature between 1976 and 1985. It seeks to fill 
something of an existing lacuna in serious academic scholarship on Sabah. While a 
number of scholars have analyzed both the preceding administration led by the United 
Sa bah National Organization {USNO, 1967 -1976) and the succeeding Parti Bersatu 
Sabah (PBS, Sabah United Party, 1985-1994) administration (e.g. Brown 2004; Kahin 
1992; Luping 1994; Means 1968; Milne 1973; Milne and Ratnam 197 4; Tilman 1976), 
considerably less work has been done on the BERJAYA administration itself. Such 
attention that has been paid to BERJAYA has tended to focus on the dramatic events 
surrounding its birth and rise to power in 1975-76 or else its sudden fall from grace in 
1984-85 (Han 1979; Loh 1992; Ramanathan 1986; Tilman 1976). No significant work 
has focused on the style and nature of the BERJAYA administration, particularly in 
relation to the increasing centralization of Federal control over Sabah State 
government during the BERJAYA administration. Kitingan and William (1989) argue that 
there has been a gradual erosion of State powers and the shifting of political control 
from the state to the centre (Federal government) since Sabah participated into the 
Malaysian Federation. The erosion of State powers brings to light the political 
framework of the Malaysian Federation, particularly with regards to the degree of 
political autonomy that the Sabah state government expected to possess in relation to 
the federal government. 
What 'Malaysian Federation' really is and whether it functions constitutionally as 
a federation shall not be the main focus of this thesis. Instead the thesis will look at the 
political implications of the Malaysian Federation upon the politics in Sabah especially 
during the BERJAYA period. In studying BERJAYA the thesis attempts to identify the 
nature of political relations between the Federal government and Sabah State 
government and how the Federal government was able to gain increasing control over 
Sabah both administratively and politically. The thesis has identified three main 
themes, federalism, ethnicity and development, to exemplify how the Federal 
government was able to increase control over the politics in Sabah during the BERJAYA 
period. The issues of federalism would contextualize the political relations between the 
Federal government and Sabah State government within the dynamics of control. It 
has been noted that the inclusion of Sabah and other Borneo territories into the 
Malaysian Federation was instrumental to 'balancing' the ratio of indigenous population 
against the majority Chinese population in Singapore (Luping 1989:4). 
However the ethnic population in Sabah was more complex than the 
demographic structure of West Malaysia. Unlike the communal politics of the Malays 
and non-Malays in West Malaysia, political affiliations in Sabah were not as clear cut. 
Ethnic heterogeneity in Sabah posed a limit to the Federal government's understanding 
and therefore control over politics in Sabah. In this context, the Federal government 
would prefer Muslim leaders like Mustapha and Harris because Islam was the nearest 
denomination to the ethnic category of Malay. Under Harris Islam gradually 
undermined the ethnic factor and simplified the Sabah population into Pribumi and non-
Pribumi, which in essence translates to the broader categories of Muslim Bumiputera, 
non-Muslim Bumiputera and non Bumiputera. The politics of ethnicity therefore 
provides an insight into how the simplification of ethnicity facilitated the increased 
Federal presence in Sabah. This process however generated its own tensions, 
particularly for the BERJAYA government. In order to overcome such tensions, the 
BERJAYA government resorted to the 'developmentalist' approach to stay in power. 
From this perspective, the thesis represents a case study of one particular 
period of administration in Sabah. The broad argument that the thesis makes can be 
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summarized thus: The emergence of a developmentalist discourse under the BERJA YA 
regime in Sabah can largely be traced to its failure to reconcile the localized ethnic 
politics of Sabah with the demands of a strong central State and thus the need to find 
an alternative strategy of political support and control. While this strategy proved 
effective while developmental growth was high during the first BERJAYA administration 
( 1976-1981), the relative collapse of the Sabah state economy from 1982 onwards 
exposed its ethnic predilections and prefigured declining support for the regime, 
particularly among the non-Muslim Bumiputera groups. This argument is thus in broad 
agreement with the recent contributions of Francis Loh (2001; 2002), who has argued 
that a developmentalist discourse is increasingly usurping the politics of ethnicity at the 
national level in Malaysia. It also, however, provides a salutary warning that such 
developmentalist strategies are necessarily dependent upon the ability of the regime to 
provide visible evidence of such development, in the absence of which, ethnicized 
politics may rear its head again with remarkable rapidity. 
This introductory chapter has three purposes. Firstly, section 1.1 identifies the 
research interest. Section 1.2 then contextualizes the research by situating it within a 
review of the academic literature of Sabah politics. The review identifies three major 
themes and two major lacunae, which this thesis seeks to fill. The themes are the 
issues of Federalism; the politics of ethnicity; and, development. The lacunae are the 
absence of a thorough historical analysis of the BERJAYA period; and, the failure to 
engage explicitly with the relationship between these three major thematic foci. 
Section 1.5 formulates research questions that address the issues raised by the 
literature review, describes the major sources and analytical framework employed. 
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1.2 Literature Review: Themes in Sabah Politics 
1.2.1 Federalism 
The study of Sabah politics usually demands an historical reference to its 
participation into the Malaysian Federation in 1963, and its subsequent political 
development within the institutional framework of a Federal system. Malaysia is 
constitutionally a Federal democracy. While the latter term in that pair has gained 
considerable attention both by domestic and international scholars (e.g. Case 1996; 
Crouch 1996; Khoo 1997; von Vorys 1975; Zakaria 1989; Loh & Khoo 2002), scholarly 
research on the Federal aspect of Malaysia politics has been scant. The un-interrupted 
incumbency of the Alliance/Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) coalition at the 
national level and its dominance of most State legislatures - only Kelantan State can 
claim more than ten years of opposition administration - is widely seen as having 
undermined any important political role for the Federal system. For Shafruddin (1987), 
Federalism in West Malaysia is most significant as a venue for intra-coalition politics. 
Such Federal crises that have emerged - such as in Sarawak in 1965 and Kelantan in 
1978 - were quickly and often harshly dealt with by the central government 
(Barraclough 1985, Chin 1997). This low estimation of the efficacy of the Federal 
system in Malaysia is reflected in the international comparative literature on 
Federalism, which tends to characterize Malaysia as an 'asymmetrical federation' 
(Requejo 2001) or even, along with India and Russia, and as 'quasi-Federal', where 
'the sub national units have limited autonomy: their very existence depends on the 
restraint of the central government' (Cameron and Falleti 2005). Increasingly, 
however, Malaysian scholars are arguing that while the Federal structure of Malaysia 
has had relatively little effect on national politics until now, it remains a potential source 
of conflict, particularly as fiscal centralization has added to 'regional frustrations and 
tensions' (Jomo and Wee 2002: 1 ). 
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In any case, the forgoing line of argument tends to focus on the West Malaysian 
States that formed the original Malayan Federation (1957-1963). It often appears 
forgotten, for instance, that tensions over Federal-State relations were the primary 
reason behind the ejection of Singapore from the federation in 1965 - an ejection 
perhaps unique among all the world's Federal countries (Milne 1966). The politics of 
Federalism in East Malaysia has also been considerably more pronounced. Indeed, 
concerns over the subordinate role that States might play in the federation and the loss 
of status for the Sultan saw Brunei pull out of the proposed merger almost literally at 
the 11th hour. The remaining two States of East Malaysia - Sabah and Sarawak -
were able to negotiate significant extra powers vis-a-vis the West Malaysian States, 
including internal control over immigration, and at least 10 years exemption from the 
requirements that Islam and Bahasa Malaysia be, respectively, the official religion and 
the official language. 
Federalism and Federal-State relations have thus attracted more interest in the 
context of East Malaysia. Lim for instance, argues that the formation of Malaysia 
initially brought &bout a 'looser federation' but that the advances of the central 
government over the ensuing decades brought 'the Malayan model of politics' to Sabah 
and Sarawak (Lim 1997: 25 & 52). This theme of the increasing 'Malayanization' of 
Sabah politics runs through both scholarly and journalistic accounts (Brown 2004; Lim 
2004; Loh 1997; Sabihah 1992). Understandably then, the focus of much attention has 
been the PBS administrations in Sabah, which represented the greatest challenge to 
this process. The PBS has been the party that has most consistently and most 
vigorously campaigned for greater decentralization of power in Malaysia. Even the 
Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS), which has managed to retain greater control over State 
administrations than the PBS, has been less vociferous on this issue - perhaps 
because its goals have always been fundamentally national, whereas the PBS is 
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essentially a regional party.1 Scholars have thus broadly argued that the emergence 
and quick ascent to power of the PBS in 1985 was as a result of a wave of Kadazan-
Dusun disillusionment with the BERJAYA administration, while its demise in 1994 was 
driven largely by the somewhat Machiavellian interference of the central government, 
combined with extravagant promises of development (e.g. Kahin 1992; Loh 1992; Loh 
1997). More recently, however, it has been argued that while this analysis remains 
broadly valid, the rise and demise of the PBS was nonetheless indicative of a kind of 
'bottomline Federalism' (Brown 2005) on two accounts. Firstly, the evident strength of 
the anti-BERJAYA backlash that brought the PBS to power forced the Federal regime into 
a reluctant acceptance and brief accommodation with the new party, rather than 
employing its apparently preferred strategies of cooptation or coercive ejection of 
troublesome State administrations. Secondly, following the ouster of the PBS in 1994, 
the Federal government and the now compliant State administration have· had to 
deliver upon the development promises made. 
The PBS period was clearly of interest in terms of the development of Federal-
State relations in Sabah. Yet this emphasis on the PBS as a challenge to the process 
of 'Malayanization' can only provide limited understanding of the process itself. Loh 
{2005) suggests the use of 'strongmen' analysis in understanding Federal-State 
relations in Sabah politics. He argues that Sabah's relatively weak political institution 
encouraged the emergence of 'strongmen politics' with the likes of Mustapha and 
Harris, but their political roles, particularly Harris, were subsequently undermined by 
the increasing process of federalisation in Sabah. The 'strongmen' analysis gives a 
useful insight into the role of agents in context of Federal-State relations. However 
further analysis into the political party system is long overdue in order to gain a deeper 
1 In 1995, the PBS contested four seats in West Malaysia- three in Penang and one in Johor- but lost 
dismally in all. Federal-State relations have been an issue for PAS in so far as it accuses the central 
government of unfair treatment in the allocation of grants, particularly when the oil royalty for Terengganu 
was revoked following the PAS victory in 1999. 
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understanding of how increasing federalisation was made possible during the BERJAYA 
administration. 
1.2.2 Ethnicity 
In contrast to the subject of Federalism, Malaysia's experiences of ethnicity and 
ethnic relations have been the subject of almost inexhaustible scholarly interest, both 
domestically and internationally. Particularly in the post-1969 period, Malaysia's 
experience of managing a multiethnic society without significant conflict has attracted 
the broad approval of many scholars of sociology, politics and development alike. 
Classic political theorists of the challenges of ethnicity such as Lijphart (1977) and 
Horowitz (1985) have held up Malaysia's form of restricted consociationalism as, if not 
a perfect form of government, at least a good example of inclusion and redistribution. 
Although the effectiveness of the New Economic Policy redistribution has been 
questioned (Bowie 1994; Jomo 1990; Khoo 2004; Maznah 2004), few scholars would 
doubt that Malaysia's experience has been relatively peaceful. As Horowitz (1989) 
notes, at the moment of independence, many analysts believed that Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka) would be relatively untroubled by its ethnic diversity, while Malaya was seen as 
facing a potentially violent future. The reverse has proven true. 
Ethnicity in Sabah is considerably more fragmented that in West Malaysia, 
without a single dominant group that has strong hegemonic claims to be the 'masters' 
of Sabah in the same way that the Malays claim sovereignty (ketuanan Melayu) over 
Malaya in particular. The ethnic make-up in Sarawak is equally heterogeneous and 
Jayum (1991) contends that the 'ethnic factor' plays a significant role in determining the 
'bargaining' strengths of the political parties found in Sarawak. The emphasis on the 
'ethnic factor' alone has the tendency to undermine the roles of other variables like 
political actors and institution in understanding the political development in Sabah. It is 
therefore important to include the Federal factor in understanding how policies of 
Islamization affected ethnic politics in Sabah since the formation of Malaysia. Indeed, 
the very inclusion of Sabah (and Sarawak) in the extended federation is widely 
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interpreted as an act of ethnic 'balancing' (e.g. Milne and Ratnam 1974: 19). With the 
British pushing Malaya to incorporate Chinese-dominated Singapore, the, inclusion of 
the East Malaysian States was seen by the elites in Kuala Lumpur as a necessary 
counterbalance to restore the numerical dominance of the Bumiputera indigenous 
groups. As Tilman (1963) commented at the time of Malaysia's formation: 
It was frankly and candidly admitted by most government officials that 
Singapore could not be brought into any constitutional arrangement 
unless the large Chinese population could be offset by the simultaneous 
absorption of at least an equal number of Malays and other indigenous 
peoples. 
(Tilman 1963: 903) 
Studies of the politics of ethnicity in Sabah since the formation of Malaysia have 
focused on the position of the Kadazan-Dusun and have highlighted three linked 
ambiguities. Firstly, they have examined the ethnic and religious diversity of the 
groups often labelled together as Kadazan, Dusun or Kadazan-Dusun - this 
terminological confusion itself is evidence of the problem - and have analyzed how far 
and why 'Kadazan nationalism' has historically been able to unite these groups (Loh 
1992; Reid 1997; Roff 1969). Here it is argued that both episodes of relative unity -
around the time of the formation of Malaysia and around the end of the BERJAYA period 
- have been a response to a common threat to the perceived interests of most of the 
Kadazan-Dusun people. Symptomatic of and catalytic in these nationalist epiphanies 
was the installation of, Donald Stephens and later Joseph Pairin Kitingan, as the 
Huguan Siou (paramount leader) of the Kadazan-Dusun people (Loh 1992: 249). Yet 
fragmentation quickly followed on both occasions. In the first case, Donald Stephens' 
conversion to Islam and his exhortation to other Kadazan-Dusun to follow suit 
diminished the symbol of unity that he held for many Kadazan-Dusun. In the latter 
case, it has been argued that Pairin's hegemonic position within the community was 
undeqnined by a deliberate 'divide and rule' strategy on the part of the BN, which 
simultaneously supported a range of different leaders and parties to 'represent' the 
Kaclazan-Dusun community in the 1990s (Brown 2004). 
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The second ambiguity identified in the literature relating to the Kadazan-Dusun 
pertains to their position within Sabah and, more broadly, within Malaysia as a whole. 
For most of the early analysts of Sabah and its position within Malaysia, 'communal 
sentiment' posited the greatest challenge to the 'new nation' (Milne and Ratnam 1974: 
61 ). They thus posited a kind of trade-off between the development benefits that 
membership of the Malaysian Federation was expected to bring against the 
ethnicization of politics, arguing that while in the long run development should 
undermine ethnic politics, the short-run risk from ethnic politics remained. The 1967 
elections were thus probably the most ethnicized in Sabah's history, with the results 
falling almost exactly along ethnic lines (Milne and Ratnam 1969). The failure of the 
Kadazan-based United Pasokmomugan Kadazan Organization {UPKO) to defeat the 
coalition of the Muslim-based USNO and the Sabah Chinese Association (seA), it is 
generally argued (Reid 1997; Roff 1974), prefigured a collapse in Kadazan nationalism, 
epitomized by Donald Stephens' conversion to Islam, 'seemingly accepting the 
argument of [USNO president] Mustapha that the Bumiputera of Malaysia should unite 
behind Malay and Muslim leadership' (Reid 1997: 129). Yet the reawakening of 
Kadazan nationalism on a number of occasions since has demonstrated that the 
relationship between development and ethnic politics was not a linear one. Indeed, as 
Loh (1992) argues of the Kadazan-Dusun resurgence that brought the PBS to power in 
1985, it was the benefits of development that brought about the emergence of an 
educated Kadazan-Dusun intelligentsia, which in turn led the political revolt against 
BERJAYA and the concomitant cultural revivalism. 
1.2.3 Development 
As already noted, a number of early appraisal of the Malaysia project envisaged 
great development benefits for Sabah (and Sarawak) through their participation in the 
federation (e.g. Milne and Ratnam 1974; Tilman 1963). Subsequent academic 
literature on the development of Sabah has tended to focus on economic performance 
of the State in relatively narrow terms (e.g. Gudgeon 1981; Hairi Abdullah et al. 1986; 
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Kaur 1998; Pang 1988). In these works, a relative coherent and consistent story is told 
of strong growth in the early years of independence, boosted by the discovery of oil in 
the early 1970s, but which started to flounder in the early 1980s. Two main factors are 
generally identified for this slowdown - firstly, the lack of a sizeable pool of human 
resources in the State; secondly, the failure to diversify the economy beyond its core 
primary industries. Thus, for instance, Pang ( 1988: 139) opines that 'the lack of 
manpower both on the skilled and unskilled levels is the most severe drag to the 
State's economic growth ... The most effective method of solving the problem is to spur 
the growth of the industrial and services sectors'. 
Until recently, however, few works have attempted to situate Sabah's economic 
development within the broader structures of the political economy of a Federal State. 
This stands in marked contrast to the neighbouring State of Sarawak, where a 
substantial literature has emerged on the political economy of resource extraction and 
development (e.g. King 1988; King 1993; Majid Cooke 1999). Wee's (1995; cf. Jomo 
and Wee 2002) comparative study of Sabah and Sarawak focussed on the State 
economies' position within the Federal system, arguing that the expectation identified 
above that East Malaysia would benefit from incorporation into the Malaysian economy 
has proved unfounded. Thus, she concludes, 'Sabah and Sarawak are slowly losing 
their favoured position in the federation' (Wee 1995: 144 ). Recent works by Sutton 
(2001) and Sadiq (2005) have also paid attention to the political economy of 
international migration into Sabah, noting how it has served a dual purpose both of 
filling the manpower gap, while simultaneously contributing to the demographic 
transformation of the State. Yet a focus on the broad political economy of the State 
and, in particular, the politics of patronage, is still absent from the literature. This is all 
the more important as it has significant links with the politics of ethnicity. Shortly after 
independence, Milne (1973) argued that while the formation of Malaysia had not 
eradicated patron-client ties in Sabah, the ethnic constellation of party politics had 
prevented patronage politics reaching the level seen in the neighbouring Philippines. 
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No academic work has examined whether this assessment endured beyond Milne's 
timeframe, and one of the objectives of this thesis will thus be to provide such an 
analysis of the political economy of the BERJAYA period. 
1.3 Research Questions and Methodology 
The research questions this thesis seeks to answer are: 
1. How did Federal-State relations in Sabah change during the BERJAYA 
administration? 
2. How did the change in Federal-State relations affect intra-coalition politics 
within the BN? 
3. To what extent did'federalism affect BERJAYA's 'multiracial' outlook in its 
development policies and strategies? 
4. Based on the assessment of the issues of federalism, politics of ethnicity 
and development, can we better understand the role of BERJAYA in Sabah 
politics? 
Methodologically, the research takes the form of a single case study within the broad 
framework of comparative politics. The single case study is an established and 
accepted method within comparative politics, in which the researcher provides a 
detailed, often exploratory, analysis of a single case that both addresses theoretical 
issues and provides a potential comparator for future research by the same researcher 
or others. As Tellis ( 1997) notes, the case study method is particularly relevant where 
'when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed' - all the more so in cases such as 
this, where existing empirical research is relatively scarce. Within the schema 
established by Stake (1995), this thesis would thus constitute an intrinsic exploratory 
case study- a case study that is both of intrinsic interest to the researcher, and that 
explores theoretical issues related to the case in question. As suggested in the 
literature review, the intrinsic interest in this thesis relates to the absence of any 
significant study of the BERJAYA period, while the theoretical and exploratory interest 
relates to the thematic interlinkages identified. The main primary data sources 
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employed are an extensive media review; selected interviews with key informants; and, 
statistical data from government publications. As far as possible, these sources have 
been triangulated to ensure accuracy of interpretation. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapters two and three provide the 
historical and analytical background, focusing on political development in Sabah in, 
respectively, the pre- and post-Independence periods. Chapter two traces the 
emergence of an administrative State under chartered company and later British crown 
rule, arguing that the both colonial regimes sought direct involvement of indigenous 
groups in government only when politically necessary, and even then only in the most 
minimal manner. This resulted in a political culture on the eve of independence which 
was reliant on individual representatives of each ethnic group as the primary means of 
political representation. Thus, in Sabah, no equivalent of the peninsular-based United 
Malays National Organization emerged as an organizational force for local interests; 
political parties were, rather, vehicles for individual ethnic leaders. Chapter three then 
analysis how this combined with the uncertain 'rules of the game' in the early years of 
independence, when Sabah's position within Malaysia and relationship with the Federal 
government was not firmly settled, to produce a period of unstable and idiosyncratic 
politics, characterised more by competing personalities and individual patronage than 
concrete policy objectives. 
Chapters four through six then provide a thematic analysis of the BERJAYA State 
governments, taking in turn the issues of Federalism, ethnicity and development. 
These chapters broadly argue that the BERJAYA period saw the emergence of a more 
sophisticated State administration, but one that was heavily dependent upon and 
compliant to Federal designs. Moreover, the persistence of the politics of patronage 
increasingly undermined the modernizing efforts of the BERJAYA governments. Despite 
its promise of a new 'multiracialism' in Sabah politics, the B~RJAYA government thus 
increasingly resorted to a kind of developmental Islamization as the only means of 
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reconciling its quest for a strong political base with the demands of its relationship with 
the Federal government and the need to outflank the more vehemently pro-Muslim 
opposition in the State. Finally, chapter seven ties the arguments together and offer 
some conclusions. 
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2.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER TWO 
SABAH BEFORE MALAYSIA 
This chapter sets the historical context for the main body of the thesis with a re-
examination of period of State formation in Sabah prior to independence, drawing 
mainly on the existing literature. The history of North Borneo is usually linked with the 
advent of the British North Borneo Company {BNAC} in 1881. Local historians like 
Ongkili once described North Borneo before 1881 as an entity with 'no community, no 
overall administration, no State economy, no State government [existed]; only 
mountains, jungles, rivers and the surrounding seas, and isolated villages scattered 
over the more than 29,000 square miles of tropical and warm equatorial land' (Ongkili 
1981: xxvii). This Statement suggests that no social or cultural forms of life existed 
before the BNBC. The lack of organized documentation on pre-1881 North· Borneo 
could be the major explanation to it. However this chapter will demonstrate that certain 
forms of socio-political organizations existed before the advent of the British North 
Borneo Company. In fact, these unstructured forms of socio-cultural existence were 
the basis for the BNBC in establishing control over the resources of the territory. The 
BNBC formed an important part of the history of Sabah because of its role in the 
historical formation of the administrative system in Sabah. 
The first section discusses the imposition of the colonial administration upon the 
traditional structures of authority and its impacts upon the social relations of the 
indigenous society in Sabah. The introduction of a Western bureaucracy into the 
Brunei-Sulu Sultanate brought about significant changes within the existing power 
structures of the old system. As the power structures of the Sultanates weakened the 
BNBC was in a better position to consolidate its power and introduced certain 
modernizing structures of administration in the territory. These changes however, did 
not appeal to the indigenous population and a number of protests and violent rebellions 
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emerged, notably the Mat Salleh Revolt of 1895-1903 and the Rundum Rebellion of 
1900-1915. 
After these revolts, the BNBC began to institute a system of native administration 
with the aim of establishing a consultative body of Native Chiefs to facilitate an effective 
dialogue between the BNBC and the leaders of the various districts in North Borneo until 
1941. After the Japanese Occupation, post-war reconstruction was beyond the 
resources of the BNBC; North Borneo and Labuan were thus ceded to the British Crown 
in 1946. Under the British Crown, Sabah was grouped with Brunei and Sarawak to 
form the British North Borneo Territories, whereby the appointed Governor of the 
Territories came under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia 
based in Malaya. The administrative reforms during this period were moving towards 
the formation of a political State which undertook planned economic development and 
the provision for better social services to raise the general standards of living of the 
population in North Borneo. 
2.2 The Jajahan system of the Brunei Sultanate 
This section examines the historical development of a modern administrative 
structure in relation to the changes that occurred within the old ruling establishments of 
the Brunei-Sulu Sultanate. The Jajahan system of the Brunei Sultanate in the West 
coast and the Datu system of the Sulu Sultanate on the East coast of Sabah were the 
earliest forms of governing structures existed before the BNBC takeover. These political 
stru,ctures were established along the coastal plains but the interior regions in Sabah 
remained outside from their control. Rivers were the main means of communication 
and transportation between the interior regions and the coastal areas. They thus 
became important sources of earnings for those who were able to control the rivers. 
In the sixteenth century, the Brunei Empire devised a unique administrative 
system by dividing and allocating its dependencies (Jajahan) that were territorially 
defined according to the valley of each river (sungai) or a major tributary forming the 
geographical core (Ranjit Singh 2000: 65). Each dependency (Jajahan) was 
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administered by agents sent from Brunei or by local entrusted chiefs responsible for 
taxation and the implementation of policies and edicts they received from the Sultan. 
The administrative structure of every Jajahan was quite similar to the ministry of 
the Brunei Sultanate at the centre. The appointed positions were hierarchical and 
linked to the power structure with the Brunei Sultanate. The imposition of the Jajahan 
system upon the independent village system of the native Kadazan-Dusun 
communities inevitably resulted in the assimilation of the Kadazan-Dusun social 
organizations into the wider structure of the Brunei establishment. Although the basic 
structure and functions of the village head and the village council were retained, the 
Kadazan-Dusun communities were subject to taxation, justice and trade imposed, by 
the Brunei authorities. 
2.3 The Datu System of the Sulu Sultanate 
In the late 181h century the North Western areas of the Brunei Jajahan came 
under the threat of the Sulu Sultanate. In the 1780s, the Sulu Sultanate was able to 
expand its territorial conquest in Borneo through maritime trading and piracy aided by 
the lllanun (lranun) and powerful Tausug Datu (Warren 2002:37). With the help from 
the Suluk, Bajau and the lllanun the Sulu Sultanate was able to undermine Brunei's 
political influence beginning from the Marudu Bay in the north and gradually moving to 
the south until Kimanis Bay. The destruction of the coastal areas of the Brunei Jajahan 
encouraged large scale migration of the people from the Southern Philippines to set up 
settlements under the Sulu patronage. Some of these Suluk, Bajau and lllanun were 
reputed slave-raiders and maritime traders who gradually settled with the Brunei and 
Kadazan-Dusun communities. 
The settlement of the Suluk, Bajau and lllanun in many Jajahan areas 
transformed the political establishments of the affected areas. The previous order was 
disrupted and the powerful Datu (lords) from the migrant communities began to exert 
their powers upon the existing .Jajahan communities. These Datu usually came from 
aristocratic background and possessed their own powerful political bases which were 
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scattered over the Sulu Archipelago and the North Eastern areas of Sabah. Unlike the 
Brunei Jajahan system, Warren (2002:27) notes that there were more than 30 
sultanates in the Mindanao-Sulu region, whereby ethnic groups like the Tausug, 
Maguindanao, lranun-Marano, Samal, and even the Europeans were constantly 
engaged in political rivalry and territorial conquests. The various leaders of these 
ethnic groups like the Maharajah, Panglima, and Datu developed their power bases by 
recruiting more followers, owning more slaves, and acquiring more territories for 
themselves (Warren 2002:166). Maritime slave trading and ownership by powerful 
Datu provided important revenue and labour resources to the overall social and political 
development the Sulu Sultanate (Warren 2002). These Datu were not tied down by the 
officialdom of hierarchy, in fact the Sulu Sultanate was quite dependent on their slave 
raiding and maritime activities for its territorial expansion. These Datu were therefore 
very independent and managed their own settlements as long as they obliged the 
decree from the Sultan and contributed some of their earnings to the Sulu Sultanate. 
Some of these powerful Datu began to invade the Brunei Jajahan areas and in 
some cases they were appointed as Jajahan head chiefs by independent Brunei 
overlords. The appointment of these Datu into the Jajahan administrative structure 
was less successful due to three reasons. Firstly, in the Datu system power was 
diffused among the Sultan and the aristocratic Datu. The Sulu Sultan was the symbol 
of religious and political head; however in practice the Sultan's position was sustained 
by the alliances forged with the wealthy and the powerful Datu (Ranjit Singh 2000: 
1 00). The administrative positions of head chiefs in the Jajahan system were 
unsuitable for these Datu who were politically ambitious and economically independent. 
Secondly, the slave-raiding and trading activities by some of these Datu disrupted the 
peace and order which the Jajahan system aimed to achieve. Thirdly, ethnic tensions 
and distrusts arose between the local communities and the migrants particularly 
towards the slave raiding Datu. The Brunei-Sulu systems failed to provide security 
under their rule which unavoidably caused the system to disintegrate. 
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2.4 The Overbeck-Dent Association and the Early Residents 
The Overbeck and Dent Association (ODA) came to North Borneo in the late 
1870s when the Brunei-Sulu Sultanates faced political threats from the domestic and 
the international scene.2 Against this background of political uncertainties the ODA was 
able to secure the North Borneo concessions from the Brunei and the Sulu Sultanates. 
The ODA negotiated the rights to govern North Borneo independently in exchange for 
annual payments of $15,000 (straits dollars) to the Brunei Sultan and $5,000 to the 
Sulu Sultan (Tregonning 1965: 14). The Acting Consul-General for Borneo at the time, 
William Treacher, oversaw the treaty which proscribed the sale of the North Borneo 
lease without the consent of the British government. This proscription was the main 
reason leading to the application for a Royal Charter, which set the stage for the 
establishment of the British North Borneo Company. 
The ODA employed three pioneering Englishmen to set up a basic system of 
administration and to make the newly acquired territory safe for commerce. William 
Pryer was the first Resident of the East Coast stationed in Sandakan, and the West 
Coast was administered by William Pretyman the Resident at Tempasuk in the north, 
with H.L Leicester as an Assistant Resident at Papar in the south (Ranjit Singh 2000: 
118). These Residents were required to nurture friendly relations with the local chiefs 
and to introduce changes with due respect to the existing customs of the indigenous 
people. On legal matters these Residents were advised to consult with the local chiefs 
and land alienation was prohibited unless it was resolved equitably (Tregonning 1954: 
36). These two important aspects provided the scope within which the administrative 
structure took shape and expanded according to the speed of modernization that was 
taking place in the territory. 
On the East Coast, Pryer faced the challenges of headstrong Datu who no 
longer had links with the waning Sulu Sultanate. General lawlessness prevailed on the 
2 
The Brunei Sultanate was facing the expansionist policies of the White Rajah from Sarawak, and the 
Sulu Sultanate was attacked by the Spanish and Dutch. 
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coastal plains and this was exacerbated by the problems of slavery. In cultivating the 
confidence of the Datu, Pryer gave proper recognition to their traditional roles by 
appointing and delegating government roles to them. A further step in broadening the 
scope of administration was the inclusion of these Datu in dispensing justice in a native 
court established for petty offences. By incorporating these local chiefs into his 
administration, Pryer was successful in managing the tense relations among the Datu 
and was therefore able to restore peace in the region (Black 1968). 
The administration at Tempasuk on the North West Coast faced a similar 
hostility from the Bajau communities. The collapse of the Jajahan system rendered the 
place unwelcoming, and the presence of Pretyman brought hope to some but also 
suspicions to others. Pretyman had to forge an alliance with those who supported him 
which meant that he had to use the inter-ethnic rivalry to shore up his position. In 
persuading the Brunei pengiran (head of a Jajahan) and the lllanun Datu to support 
Pretyman, the Bajau Datu was less likely to oppose the Resident. His efforts opened 
the way for the wider participation of local chiefs from various ethnic groups in the 
administration, whereby Pretyman would oblige the presence of a few native chiefs as 
assistant judges in the administration of justice. Through wider participation, the 
longstanding hostilities between the Bajau and the Kadazan-Dusun communities were 
resolved and trade was resumed through a weekly tamtl started in the Residency. 
Despite the confident prediction of one Bajau chief that the Dusun had 'never paid, and 
will never pay taxes', Pretyman was also able to induce the Dusun to pay taxes, 
apparently willingly (quoted in Black 1968: 179). 
The Assistant Resident, H.L Leicester, only had a short stint in Papar because 
he failed to develop good relations with the local chiefs. He was then replaced by A.H. 
Everett who became the Resident at Papar, overseeing the whole administration of the 
3 The tamu is a weekly market which provided a formalized means of exchange, and became popular 
since the 1860s in western Sat:Jah. These tamu became an important site of peace between warring 
ethnic groups. A stone would be erected and oaths undertaken by the respective chi,}fs promising to 
regulate the behaviour of their followers according to certain rules and regulations. Tne tamu is still being 
practiced until the present day (Ranjit Singh 2000: 75). 
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West Coast including Tempasuk.4 Everett also faced the mounting problems of crime 
and local resistance in Papar but managed to overcome these problems by delegating 
official duties to the local chiefs under his administration. The local resistance to 
Everett was slightly more organized than the other areas because some of the local 
chiefs were able to procure arms from Labuan. However their only deterrent was the 
fear that the British military would retaliate with an even greater force. The fear of 
British reprisal was the only thing that saved Everett from the fierce local resistance 
because the reinforcement which he ordered never came. 
The waning influence of the Brunei-Sulu Sultanates generated a sense of 
liberation for some but also posed problems to other local chiefs. Those local chiefs 
who had the wealth and power to protect their own territories or tulin were more likely 
to survive the disintegration of the Sultanates. However those local chiefs who only 
held appointed positions in the Jajahan tended to falter in the face of expansionist 
moves by the independent chiefs or Datu. The introduction of a resident style of 
administration redefined their roles as powerful local chiefs. By virtue of their positions, 
they became the first persons to establish official relations with the western Residents. 
Quite apart from receiving official edicts from their respective Sultanates, these local 
chiefs directly interacted with the Resident and to a considerable extent actively 
participated in the running of the administration. 
The introduction of a western administrative system added a modern element of 
social organization into the workings of the indigenous society. These European 
Residents became prominent social figures in a society subject to two kingdoms that 
were institutionally detached from the lives of the people. The Residents were 
responsible for introducing a more participatory model of administration into a society 
that was detached from the direct rule of the Sultanates. Both the Jajahan system in 
the West and the Datu system in the East coast of Sabah showed that the leadership 
4 
Pretyman left Tempasuk after a couple of years due to ill health, leaving Captain Witti in charge of the 
local administration in Tempasuk. 
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structure among the native chiefs differed in relation to the power structure of the two 
Sultanates. The Datu system seemed to cultivate relatively more independent local 
chiefs than the Jajahan system although the latter seemed more stable as an 
administrative structure. Under the Resident system, the previous order became 
subject to the assertiveness of these Residents and the whole administrative function 
was characterised by 'highly personalized rule with little coordination or centralization' 
(Ranjit Singh 2000: 129). 
The highly personalized style of the Residency system was to some extent 
agreeable with the leadership style of the local chiefs. However the Residency system 
was limited to the coastal plains of Sabah and did not extend to the interior regions due 
to the shortage of staff and the limited resources of the ODA. When the British North 
Borneo Company replaced the ODA, the Residency system was initially maintained but 
the administrative apparatus was being expanded further into the interior region. This 
expansion demanded increasing the number of posts and personnel. The sudden 
replacement of existing Residents like Everett by G.L Davies for instance, inevitably 
disrupted the personal relations that had been cultivated and this disruption also 
created suspicions among local chiefs regarding the inconsistent nature of leadership 
showed by the new administration. 
2.5 The British North Borneo BNBC 1881-1941 
The BNBC was formed in 1881 and from 1882 administered the territory of North 
Borneo until the end of 1941, when the Japanese occupation ended Company rule. 
The Company was dissolved in 1953. Under the BNBC the territory was administered 
by a Governor, a nominated Legislative Council and a Civil Service, but the final seat of 
authority was the Court of Directors of the Company, which sat in London. The 
Company, under the Charter, was the Government of the territory and had to maintain 
a civil administration. But the Company was mindful of its shareholders and promoted 
the territory as a money-making enterprise for prospective investors. Because of the 
need to protect the financial interests of the shareholders, the BNBC tended to focus on 
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the process of legislating rules and regulations for trade and commerce as the basis for 
its administration in North Borneo. Hence it was imperative that cost of, running the 
administrative functions of the BNBC remained low. 
The BNBC operated differently from the other chartered companies such as the 
East India Company, the Royal Niger (1886-1900) and British South African (1889-
1923). For the BNBC, the 'overriding question ... was how to rule cheaply' (William 
1981: 3). The first governor, W.H Treacher thus claimed that the development of the 
territory was best left to private capital, and the role of the Company was to establish 
suitable conditions for these enterprises to flourish (Kahin 1947: 51). The BNBC set out 
to achieve two important objectives. The first objective was the provision of stable 
conditions agreeable for foreign trade and investments. This involved improving 
infrastructural facilities, and expanding the administrative framework of the existing 
Residency system. The second objective pertained to the Company's guidelines on 
the treatment of the indigenous people in the territory. In principle the Royal Charter 
stipulated that the Company was required to protect the property and personal rights of 
the native and was prohibited from interfering with local religions and all beliefs (Ranjit 
Singh 2000: 142). However the policy of protecting native property rights was 
secondary to the requirements of protecting the interests of the private capitalists. 
The Residency system included Assistant Residents and District Officers. 
However the administrative structure was quite loose and lacked the consideration for 
the separate roles of the executive and the judicial functions of the administration. 
These problems were complicated by the prevailing socio-political conditions in the 
territory, and contributed to the Company's substantial financial drain in the process of 
acquiring the remaining tulin or rivers which were still governed by independent Brunei 
pengiran. In order to stem further financial losses Treacher began to alienate large 
tracts of lands at very low price in order to attract foreign investors and planters into 
North Borneo. The Land Regulation of 1883 offered lots of 100 acres and above for a 
999 year lease upon the payment of a premium of $1 per acre, free of quit rent (Ranjit 
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Singh 2000: 147). The wholesale commercialization of land was unprecedented and to 
a considerable extent this practice did not conform to the traditional norms of some of 
the local population. The concerns with such practices were articulated by the 
members of the Native Chiefs' Advisory Council when it was established after the 
native revolts at the turn of the century. 
Financial issue aside, the Company also faced serious labour problems due to 
the scarce population in North Borneo. The earliest census in 1887 estimated about 
150,000 people in North Borneo (Ranjit Singh 2000). However the labour problems in 
the territory were further complicated by the institution of slavery. Slavery was 
prevalent along the coastal areas of North Borneo, and Pryer related his experience on 
the issue regarding the difficulty of getting people to work for him. 'They offered to 
work if I would buy them but to work for wages was then looked down upon as much 
more degrading than being a slave' (quoted in Tregonning 1953: 26). The idea of 
wage labour was still an alien concept in North Borneo and this prompted Treacher to 
encourage Chinese immigration to overcome the labour shortage in Sabah. In 1891 
Treacher declared that 'the experience in the Straits Settlements, the Malay Peninsula 
and Sarawak has shown that the people to cause rapid financial progress in Malayan 
countries are the hard-working, money-loving Chinese, and these are the peoples 
whom the Company should lay themselves out to attract to Borneo. Once we get them 
to voluntarily migrate, the financial success of the Company would, in my opinion, be 
secured' (quoted in Kahin 1947: 57). 
Besides overcoming labour shortage, the Company was also interested in the 
Chinese-run opium farming trade as these became important sources of taxation 
revenue for the Company. The Company's revenue from opium amounted to over half-
a-million (straits) dollars, out of a total revenue of about three and half million (Singh 
2000: 151 ). The simple economy of the territory was transformed into a capitalist mode 
of production through the acquisition of land and the introduction of wage labour into 
the traditional society of North Borneo. The Company therefore played a vital role in 
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making North Borneo a commercial entity and this, in turn, affected the way in which 
the administrative structure took shape. 
The process of opening up the territory marked the beginning of the intrusion on 
the property and personal rights of the indigenous people. The personalized relations 
that existed between the Residents and the local chiefs gradually eroded as a result of 
the Company's policies on land tenure, labour and the acquisition of rivers (tulin). The 
gradual breakdown of the relations between indigenous chiefs and the European 
officers was imminent. In the context of different administrative arrangements and the 
varying status of chiefs under the Jajahan system in the West coast and the Datu 
system in the East coast, many chiefs remained relatively independent in areas where 
the Company's presence was minimal. The BNBC tried to solve these problems by 
issuing the Village Administration Proclamation of 1891 (amended 1893). It was hoped 
that this Proclamation could regulate the existing institutions of indigenous authority in 
the territory. 5 The proclamation legitimized some indigenous leaders but also sidelined 
quite a number of independent chiefs who were opposed to the Company's policies. 
The Company's administration depended considerably upon the Resident's 
knowledge of local politics. Because of financial constraints and the lack of trained 
legal officers these Residents and Assistant Residents had to run the administration 
and to resolve issues of legal concern as well. At the top level the Company's policy 
on representing the interests of Western investors prevailed. A Consultative council 
was set up in 1885 which consisted of the Governor, the Residents, the Heads of 
Department, and an unofficial, W.G. Darby, of the China Borneo Company (Singh 
2000: 164). This council aimed to coordinate the activities of the major traders in North 
Borneo with those of the Company administration. No attempt was made to encourage 
native representation despite instructions from the Court of Directors in London. On 
5 
'No headman or chief who has not been expressly authorized to act as a headman under this 
Proclamation either by warr<:ht from the Governor or by written permit from the chief district officers shall 
be deemed to have been appointed under this Proclamation or be entitled to exercise any of the powers 
~ · conferred on headmen by this Proclamation.' (Singh 2000: 159) · 
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